Defining consciousness

In neuroscience and psychology, few concepts have sparked as much debate and fascination as consciousness. The question “Is consciousness an event or a construct?” goes to the heart of both philosophical and scientific inquiry. Though not new—it dates back to ancient Greek philosophy and has resurfaced through the cognitive revolution—N.W. Smith’s 1997 article Consciousness: Event or Construct? offers a deep dive into how our understanding of consciousness has evolved.

Smith critically analyzes the perspectives of key consciousness theorists like Daniel Dennett, Julian Jaynes, and David Chalmers. Their theories range from consciousness as the “core of mind” to a cultural metaphor that evolved alongside human civilization. What makes this article particularly compelling is its challenge to the entrenched mind-body dualism. Smith provocatively suggests that consciousness may not be an inherent, measurable event, but rather a construction born of our interactions with the world, shaped by historical and cultural contexts.

In the realm of biofeedback and neurofeedback, understanding consciousness plays a central role, especially when these methods rely on the individual becoming aware of physiological processes. By unpacking whether consciousness is a side-effect or a central measurable event, we can better tailor feedback protocols to enhance self-regulation and cognitive performance.

Methods

Smith’s work does not present experimental methodology in the traditional sense. Instead, it provides a critical and comparative analysis of major theories on consciousness. His approach is philosophical and analytical, breaking down arguments and their scientific implications. The main theories examined include:

Daniel Dennett (1969, 1991)

• Centralist view: Consciousness is seen as a cluster of internal states forming the mind’s core.

• Rejects the idea of the “Cartesian Theater,” proposing instead that the brain operates via parallel processes that generate fragmented drafts of reality—eventually unified into what we experience as consciousness.

Julian Jaynes (1976)

• Bicameral mind theory: Jaynes suggests that consciousness only recently emerged when the brain’s hemispheres began integrating.

• Ancient civilizations, he argues, operated under hallucinated commands from gods—a theory linking neurological evolution with cultural development.

David Chalmers (1995)

• Defines consciousness as “the subjective inner life of the mind,” highlighting the hard problem: how do physical brain processes turn into subjective experiences (qualia)?

Thomas Natsoulas and Karl Pribram

• Offer nuanced definitions by distinguishing consciousness from related concepts such as self-awareness, attention, and mind.

Smith, in his article, contrasts these with an interbehavioral perspective, which rejects the dualist mind-body split and views consciousness not as an isolated entity but as an event rooted in organism-environment interaction.

Results

Smith’s comparative analysis reveals that while consciousness is universally acknowledged, there is little consensus on its true nature. Key takeaways include:

Diverging Definitions:

• Dennett sees consciousness as a narrative byproduct of brain processes, dismissing traditional mental imagery.

• Jaynes frames consciousness as a recent socio-cultural phenomenon tied to language and societal complexity.

• Chalmers underscores the unresolved mystery of how neuronal activity becomes subjective experience.

Consciousness as Construct:

• Smith argues that consciousness lacks a clear, observable referent and is better seen as a verbal and cultural construct rather than an empirical event.

• He critiques dualist and mystical approaches, noting many definitions are grounded in historical bias and linguistic tradition rather than scientific rigor.

Interbehavioral View:

• Consciousness is conceptualized as part of a dynamic field of organism-environment interactions.

• Rather than residing “in” the brain, consciousness emerges from relational contexts.

Discussion

The implications of Smith’s analysis reach far beyond academic theory. If consciousness is indeed a construct, how does this affect practices like neurofeedback, which depend heavily on self-awareness?

Applications in Biofeedback and Neurofeedback:

• Viewing consciousness as an interactional event could reshape neurofeedback protocols.

• It suggests that external stimuli and environmental context may influence self-regulation just as much as internal brain states.

• Emphasizing the interplay between brain activity and environmental cues could lead to more effective strategies than targeting isolated brainwave patterns.

Rethinking Clinical Practices:

• Jaynes’ theory implies that consciousness—and by extension, self-awareness—can be culturally modulated.

• This opens possibilities for personalized neurofeedback protocols that account for cultural background, language frameworks, and social environment.

Beyond Mind-Body Dualism:

• Smith’s interbehavioral approach offers a refreshing break from traditional dualism.

• By focusing on consciousness as relational, neurofeedback practitioners can explore holistic models integrating environmental, physiological, and psychological elements.

Broader Research Themes:

• This article aligns with trends in cognitive science challenging reductionist models of consciousness.

• Embodied cognition frameworks also emphasize the body and environment in shaping thought processes.

• Affective neuroscience highlights the role of emotion—long viewed as peripheral to consciousness—as central to cognition.

Brendan’s Perspective

This piece is a goldmine for anyone invested in the philosophical foundations of neurofeedback. The idea that consciousness is a construct rather than an event resonates deeply with how we approach clinical neurofeedback. Instead of chasing an elusive “inner awareness,” we should focus on the dynamic interplay between brain, body, and context.

EEG protocols can benefit by shifting attention from isolated waveforms to more integrated, context-aware feedback systems. For instance, SMR training for attention might be enhanced with environmental tweaks that support focus. Similarly, alpha wave protocols for relaxation may be more effective when combined with mindfulness or environmental changes (e.g., lighting, sound).

Smith’s critique of biased research—especially the overvaluation of brain signals at the expense of context—reminds us to treat the client as a whole person, not just a brain in a chair.

Consciousness as an Active Ingredient in Neurofeedback

In many neurofeedback protocols, success is often attributed to mechanisms like operant conditioning—rewarding the brain for producing desired patterns of activity. But this view can overlook a crucial factor: consciousness itself. Neurofeedback is not just about reinforcing brain states; it’s about engaging the person in voluntary self-regulation.

What this article reminds us is that consciousness is more than an epiphenomenon—it’s a participant. When someone learns to shift their state through feedback, they’re not passively receiving rewards. They’re actively tuning into internal cues, adjusting focus, regulating arousal, and exploring strategies—all of which require awareness, intention, and interpretation.

This is why neurofeedback isn’t just a neurological process; it’s a psychophysiological one. Consciousness provides the framework for:

• Interpreting feedback (e.g., “When I feel calmer, the bar rises.”)

• Developing internal strategies (e.g., visualization, breath control, or memory recall)

• Volitional regulation (actively choosing how to respond to feedback)

From this lens, neurofeedback becomes a form of conscious training, where awareness is not a by-product but a core mechanism of change. The individual isn’t simply shaping the brain—they are learning about themselves in real time.

This also explains why engagement varies so widely across individuals: it’s not just about protocol fidelity, but about how well the person connects consciously with the process. By recognizing this, we can design protocols that support conscious involvement—through meaningful metaphors, contextual relevance, and interfaces that invite reflection and agency.

If neurofeedback is to become a truly transformative tool, we must treat consciousness not as a side effect, but as an active ingredient in the learning process. And that means respecting the full complexity of human experience—not just reinforcing patterns, but empowering people to explore and shape their own neural narrative.

Conclusion

Smith’s Consciousness: Event or Construct? pushes us to rethink one of the most foundational aspects of human existence. By presenting consciousness as a construct shaped by interaction and history, rather than a brain-bound event, the article opens up new pathways for research and clinical practice. Agree or disagree with any of the arguments presented (and I disagree with plenty of them, trust me!) it's hugely important to consider this in our day-to-day practise.

In biofeedback and neurofeedback, this lens encourages a more holistic and integrative approach—one that considers not just brainwaves, but the full spectrum of interactions that shape conscious experience.

Ultimately, whether consciousness is an event or a construct may remain unresolved—but the pursuit of better questions marks the beginning of deeper understanding.

Reference:

Smith, N. W. (1997). Consciousness: Event or Construct. In L. J. Hayes & P. M. Ghezzi (Eds.), Investigations in Behavioral Epistemology (pp. 147–161). Reno, NV: Context Press.